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NATURE OF CASE 
This is a contract action commenced by Melinda Rudd, Administratrix 
of the Estate of Hyman Rudd, against Mel Parks, purchaser of Hyman Rudd's 
business, for collection of payments accruing after Hyman Rudd's death and 
payable in accordance with the provisions of a Covenant Not to Compete 
executed in connection with the sale of Mr. Rudd's business to Defendant. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The District Court for Salt Lake County held that the death of Hyman 
Rudd did not terminate the obligation of Mel Parks to make payments under 
the subject Covenant Not to Compete, in a judgment made and entered on the 
23rd day of September, 1977. 
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-Appellant seeks to have the judgment reversed, with instructions 
to the District Court to enter judgment dismissing Plaintiff's action. Alter-
natively, Defendant requests remand to the trial court to determine the amount 
of consideration to be attributed to the Covenant Not to Compete, including that 
part to be forfeited after the death of Hyman Rudd. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Melinda Rudd is the daughter of Hyman Rudd who died in October of 1975. 
She was appointed as Administratrix of the Estate of Hyman Rudd on December 12, 
1975. Prior to October, 1973, Hyman Rudd had worked in the waste and refuse 
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collection business, under the name of Salt Lake Sanitation, of which he was1. 
sole owner. Mr. Rudd had conducted his business in the Salt Lake area forrr. 
years and was well acquainted with the many competing companies and their; 
sonnel. He was also an active member of the Utah Trash Handler's Associat; 
Defendant Mel Parks is a resident of Boise, Idaho, and has also been 
associated with the trash collection industry in Idaho for many years (Tr. pai 
15, line 2 7) l· During this career in the trash collection industry, Mel Parks 
had previously made purchases of such businesses (Tr. page 16, line 1-3). 
On January 26, 1973, Hyman Rudd made a visit to his doctor compla1t 
of chest pains, and was diagnosed as having had a heart attack. Sometime th 
after, Mel Parks was contacted by Hynda Rudd, the wife of Hyman Rudd and' 
advised that he had had a heart attack and wanted to sell the business (Tr. pa. 
lines 5-10). Several weeks later, Mel Parks visited Salt Lake City and talket 
Mr. Rudd about the purchase of his business. After considerable negotiatio11 
Mr. Parks instructed Jesse Walters, his attorney, to send Mr. Rudd a lette: 
making a formal offer to purchase the business, stipulated on separate alloco 
of consideration for the sale of equipment, the sale of customer accounts anc 
will, and a covenant not to compete (Tr. page 17, line 26). This offer was di 
and negotiations continued until tentative terms were acknowledged as accept 
lsince the proceedings at the District Court were conducted in accorc 
with a pre-trial order dated June 23, 1977, and signed by the Honorable Ear; 
Baldwin, Jr., much of the fact summary is based on that source. Citation! 
erences in support of such facts have not been included in view of the stipuJa: 
facts of the pre-trial order. Any facts not specifically recited in the subject 
trial order have been appropriately identified by cross references to the tra 
record. 
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by the parties in September, 1973. 
Upon obtaining a tentative agreement, Mel Parks instructed his attorney, 
Jesse Walters, to prepare documents to effect the sale and purchase of Salt Lake 
Sanitation. These documents consisted of (1) Agreement to Sell and Purchase 
Equipment, (2) Agreement to Sell and Purchase Customer Accounts and Goodwill, 
and (3) Covenant Not to Compete. Both Parks and Rudd were advised by their 
respective accountants, Ray Carter and Dexter Snow, as to the tax aspects of 
these agreements. Rudd was specifically advised by Snow as to the adverse tax 
effects of the Covenant Not to Compete, to the effect that such payments would be 
taxed as ordinary income and not capital gains. It was Hyman Rudd's determination 
that such terms were acceptable in order to effect the sale of the business and 
were the only terms on which Mel Parks would buy Salt Lake Sanitation. 
The three stated agreements were signed by Mel Parks in Idaho and then 
by Hyman Rudd in Utah. The terms of the Agreement to Sell and Purchase Equip-
ment (Exhibit 3-P), and the Agreement to Sell and Purchase Customer Accounts 
and Goodwill (Exhibit 2-P) were fully performed by both parties. The first of 
these agreements conveyed equipment to Mel Parks for a total consideration of 
$83, 000. The agreed form of payment was that Mel Parks would assume outstanding 
debts owed by Rudd totaling $82, 613. 88, and would pay the difference of $386.12 
in cash. The second agreement transferred customer accounts and goodwill to 
Parks in exchange for a $15, 000 cash payment. 
The third agreement was a Covenant Not to Compete operable over a period 
of five years. The consideration to be paid by Parks for the forebearance of Hyman 
Rudd under this Covenant Not to Compete consisted of "the sum of $95, 000, payable 
-3-
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as follows: the sum of $6, 500 on January ZO, 1974, and the sum of $1, 500 pe; 
month on the 20th day of each month thereafter until December ZO, 1978 ... " 
Mel Parks faithfully performed his payment obligations under this agreement 
until the death of Hyman Rudd in October, 1975, paying a total of $36, 000. p 
did not make further payments following Rudd's death. 
During the performance period prior to the death of Hyman Rudd, no 
objections were raised by either party as to any term of the agreements. Th: 
only agreement in issue is the Covenant Not to Compete, that issue being rai: 
by the Estate as to the continuation of payments after the death of Hyman Ruci1 
Mr. Parks asserts that the payment obligation under a Covenant Not to Com~ 
terminates at the death of the noncompeting party. The Estate of Mr. Ruddl 
right to continued payments. 
ARGUMENTS 
The primary basis of error presented herein deals with the failure oi 
Trial Court to treat the subject Covenant Not to Compete as a restrictive co1' 
with the attendant legal limitations as to purpose and enforceability. Defendi 
submits that the Court, instead, viewed the Covenant as a means to sell the 
business, and not as an agreement having separate and distinct vah:.e aside': 
the conveyance of business assets. Defendant asserts that if the Court had 
treated the subject Covenant in accordance with the expressed intent of the P: 
to have a formal covenant not to compete, both law and equity would have re1 
a holding in favor of Defendant. 
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POINT I 
EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT FINDING BY COURT THAT THE SALES 
TRANSACTION WAS MERELY "FORMALIZED BY USING THREE SEPARATE 
DOCUMENTS TO GIVE IT LEGAL EFFECT ... " (Tr. page 120, line 1-2). 
The clear implication of the trial court's finding as stated above is that 
the Covenant Not to Compete was an arbitrary allocation of a total sales price and 
therefore should not be the basis for avoiding full payment of the total sales price. 
This conclusion is contrary to the preponderance of evidence presented at trial, 
especially in light of Plaintiff's burden of proof. Defendant submits that the 
weight of evidence establishes that the Covenant Not to Compete was an essential 
part of the transaction and not the product of mere formalization. 
It is admitted, for example, by stipulation in the pre-trial order (R. 139, para! 
and by Plaintiff's Findings of Fact (No. 8, R-192) that the Agreement to Sell and 
Purchase Equipment and the Agreement to Sell and Purchase Customer Accounts 
and Goodwill "having been fully performed, present no problem in this cause, 
having been admitted to establish the entirity of the transaction, and the validity 
of the Non-Competition Covenant as ancillary to the sale of a business." If indeed 
the first two agreements have been fully performed and there are no problems 
with respect thereto, then the effect of these agreements should stand as written. 
This is true with respect to sufficiency of consideration inasmuch as Plaintiff has 
not placed any of the provisions of these two agreements in issue. 
Inspection of the Agreement to Sell and Purchase Equipment shows that 
consideration of $82, 000 was paid by Mel Parks in return for equipment conveyed 
in connection with the purchase of the business. Plaintiff neither alleged nor 
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equipment, nor that the consideration was insufficient on any basis. Hyman:, 
signed the agreement, performed under the agreement, and made no objectic:, 
to the terms of the agreement. Indeed, Plaintiff has confirmed that the agre, 
was performed in full and is not an issue, except to establish the entirety of: 
transaction. 
Likewise with the Agreement to Sell and Purchase Customer Account;, 
Goodwill, Plaintiff has confirmed full performance and satisfaction with the!, 
thereof. Plaintiff produced no evidence showing improper valuation of either 
customer accounts or goodwill, nor was such an issue raised during the pro1, 
Under the pre-trial order which governs the proceedings in trial, thi1 
same fact was specifically admitted, stating in Section III, para. K.: 
"The terms of agreement i and ii have been fully performed by 
both parties. Exhibit i conveyed equipment to Parks for a total 
consideration of $83, 000---$386.12 in cash to Rudd and the balance 
as assumption of outstanding debts owed by Rudd. Exhibit ii 
transferred customer accounts and goodwill to Parks in return 
for $15, 000 in cash." 
If the effect of these agreements, having been fully performed, was to conve: 
the business equipment, customer accounts and goodwill, then the clear imp. 
is that there is no issue with respect to the sufficiency of consideration of th: 
transferred items under the two agreements. 
The Covenant Not to Compete, therefore, which was the only agreeI111 
in issue in this case, could not reasonably be construed to be consideration' 
purchase of equipment, accounts and goodwill. Since these were the only as: 
of the business, the only item of value remaining in the transaction was to 5' 
the forbearance from competition by Hyman Rudd, as was stated in the CoveL 
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Not to Compete. This conclusion is specifically stated in the premises of the 
Covenant Not to Compete (Exhibit 1-P, line 13), "WHEREAS, the Seller has sold 
to Buyer, and the Buyer has purchased from Seller, the Salt Lake Sanitation, 
NOW THEREFORE ... " (Emphasis added). It is apparent that the past tense 
expressed "has sold" and "has purchased" represents the clear intent of the 
parties that the Agreements to Sell and Purchase Equipment, and to Sell and 
Purchase Customer Accounts and Goodwill had, in fact, already transferred the 
business assets to Mel Parks before effecting the Covenant Not to Compete, 
Since the first two agreements had in fact been fully performed as admitted 
by the Plaintiff and expressed by the "Whereas" clause in the Covenant Not to 
Compete, then the business assets were sold at such time of full performance 
of these respective first two agreements. It is therefore inconsistent to assert 
that payments due under the Covenant Not to Compete represent further consider-
ation for the same purchase of business assets. 
The evidence presented at trial supports the proposition that the Covenant 
Not to Compete was intentionally included in the transaction for the purpose of 
preserving the purchased business in the hands of Mel Parks and was therefore 
based on separate consideration. As stated previously, Hyman Rudd had a long 
association in the trash collection industry in the geographical area in which 
Park's newly acquired business would operate. The close business relationships 
developed by Hyman Rudd over this long period of time and his long standing 
association with the many competing trash hauling businesses in the area presented 
a serious threat to the value of the purchase made by Parks, unless such a Covenant 
-7-
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Not to Compete was placed in effect. Without such a covenant Hyman Rudd ci 
take advantage of his long relationship with both customers and competing e~ 
prises and virtually destroy Salt Lake Sanitation, along with any value acquir 
in the purchase transaction. 
The fact that Mel Parks was a total stranger to the community, being 
resident of Boise, Idaho, further emphasized the risk of such a purchase wii. 
the associated Covenant Not to Compete. It is well known, for example, that 
customers to a service related enterprise such as the trash collection indust: 
place primary reliance on the management and not on the mere ownership or 
of the business. Therefore the acquisition of Salt Lake Sanitation by Mel Pa; 
a man totally unknown to the former customers of Hyman Rudd, would reprn 
little or no guarantee of future business with such customers. Hypothetical!: 
Hyman Rudd could have acted in a consultant capacity to one or more compet 
trash hauling companies and utilized his personal influence with fo=er cust 
to motivate a change of accounts away from Salt Lake Sanitation. 
Having transacted other purchases of trash collection businesses (Tr. 
16, line 10), Mel Parks appreciated the gravity of risk in coming into a new: 
and taking over an ongoing business. It was for this reason that the Covenai 
to Compete was included in the transaction. As stated in Mr. Park's testiin 
(Tr. page 30, line 9-18) and as stipulated in the admitted facts under the prf 
order, Mr. Park's would not have purchased Salt Lake Sanitation, excepti1 
inclusion of the Covenant Not to Compete. 
The fact that all of the parties to this lawsuit acknowledge that Mel F 
would not have purchased the Salt Lake Sanitation business for the stated toi 
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purchase price of $192, 000 is clear evidence showing the primary consideration 
basis of the Covenant Not to Compete. The failure of Plaintiff to negate this fact 
leaves little doubt that the Covenant Not to Compete was an integral element to 
the meeting of the minds on this sale of transaction, and not the result of mere 
formalization of a sale of business assets. 
POINT II 
THE TRANSFER OF SALT LAKE SANITATION BY MEANS OF THREE 
AGREEMENTS STATED IN TERMS OF A TOTAL SALES PRlCE DOES NOT 
SUPPORT A CONCLUSION THAT THE AGREEMENTS COMPRlSED A SINGLE 
CONTRACT WHOSE PAYMENT PROVISIONS ARE IMMUNE FROM THE INDIVIDUAL 
EFFECTS APPLYING TO EACH OF THE THREE AGREEMENTS. 
In viewing the facts of the subject transaction, the Court should note the 
commercial realities which face parties involved in the sale of a sole proprietorship 
such as Salt Lake Sanitation. It has been held, for example, that where a sole 
proprietor sells his entire business, that business must be "comminuted into its 
fragments. " William Y McGowen, 152 F2d 570 (2 Cir). Under the present law, 
the fragments consist of (1) goodwill which is a capital asset, (2) equipment and 
fixtures, and (3) merchandise, accounts, and notes receivable, which are ordinary 
assets. P-H Fed Tax 32,097 "Sale of entire business." Defendant asserts that 
this transfer was effected by the first two agreements previously discussed. 
Frequently, such a sale of an entire business will not be of value unless 
the Buyer is able to protect himself against subsequent competitive acts of the 
Seller. The Covenant Not to Compete is usually included to give legal effect to 
such protection. It is well accepted law, however, that this "restrictive covenant 
must be incidental or ancillary to a valid contract of sale or other transfer of 
-9-
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property if it is. to be enforceable. " See 45 ALR 2d 77. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that many legal form books incorporate a Covenant Not to Compete 
paragraph into a single sales transaction agreement (Tr. page 100, lines 7., 
Furthermore, it is not uncommon for such a sales transaction agreement to 
specify a total sales price and then allocate the total sales price into its respi 
fragments of assets and also to a value for the Covenant Not to Compete, WL 
an allocation of consideration is not made to the Covenant Not to Compete, th: 
Courts have had occasion to assign a value to the Covenant Not to Compete b" 
on the intent of the parties. In the tax case of Comm. v. Killian 314 F2d 852, 
(5 Cir., 1963) the Court stated: 
"Whether any portion of the sales price should be attributed to a 
Covenant Not to Compete depends upon whether the parties treated 
the Covenant as a saparate and distinct item and whether the purcha· 
se rs actually pa.id anything for the Covenant as a separate item in 
the deal." 
Both the evidence presented at trial and the express agreements of th• 
parties support the proposition that not only was the subject Covenant Not to 
Compete treated separately, but that the Covenant Not to Compete was the ba' 
of finalizing the agreement. As was admitted by the parties hereto that exce: 
for the Covenant Not to Compete with its accompanying restriction, Mel Par: 
would not have purchased the business. It is clear therefore that the Coven> 
Not to Compete was a separate and critical part of the sales transaction and 
should be considered as a separate aspect of consideration. 
Plaintiff has not shown that the total sales price was determined wit1 
regard to a Covenant Not to Compete or that the Covenant was without indepi 
-10-
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consideration from the business assets. Plaintiff has also failed to show that the 
covenant was not treated as a "separate and distinct item." Instead the testimony 
and documents show that the Covenant Not to Compete was a condition of the sale 
from the very outset of negotiations. The testimony of Parks was, "I agreed to 
buy the business stipulated on three separate contracts." (Tr. page 14, lines 15, 
26.) The testimony of Mr. Walters, who drafted the agreements, was "I was 
instructed by Mr. Parks relative to the important terms of the Covenant Not to 
Compete, precisely, the financial amount and the location of the noncompete 
agreement as to what area it would cover." (Tr. page 93, lines 23-26.) His 
testimony further indicated that it was Mr. Park's instructions to effect the 
transaction by three separate agreements, and such decision was not his choice 
of drafting. (Tr. page 93, line 27.) The overall effect of the evidence as to the 
"separate and distinct" treatment of the Covenant Not to Compete is given by the 
trial court as follows: 
"Isn't it quite evident that we all know that it (Covenant Not to Compete) 
was an integral part? It was an important part of the contract. You've 
got it here signed by both parties." (Tr. page ll6, lines 27-30.) 
It is therefore submitted that the three agreements forming the sales 
transaction, and particularly the Covenant Not to Compete, were not merely 
"formalized ... to give it legal effect ... "; but to the contrary, the Covenant Not to 
Compete had separate and independent meaning from the first two agreements 
effecting the sale of business as sets. 
For the Trial Court to state that the three agreements appeared to form 
"one entire transaction between Parks as the Buyer and Rudd as the Seller", does 
-11-
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not therefore resolve the issues of this case. As has been shown, virtuallye 
sale of an on-going business with a Covenant Not to Compete will appear as "o 
transaction" because the restrictive covenant must be ancillary or incident to 
sale. In the present case Parks did all he could to show separate and indepet: 
intent of the covenant. He directed his attorney to draft it as a separate agrei 
he conditioned the sale on the execution of such a covenant and he extended thi 
payment obligations of the covenant over a period of time consistent with the 
noncompetition obligation of Rudd. 
POINT Ill 
REFERENCE BY THE PARTIES TO A "TOTAL SALES PRICE" DOES 
NEGATE THE INDEPENDENT VALUE AND LEGAL STATUS OF THE COVE: 
NOT TO COMPETE. 
During the course of the trial Mr. Parks indicated his expectation at: 
time of signing the subject agreements that $192, 000 would be paid to Rudd. 
Court apparently determined from this expectation that the agreements repre 
an "entire transaction" totaling $192, 000, and that Parks should be required 
this amount, based on this expectation. This conclusion, however, ignores: 
specific finding of fact that this expectation was founded on the state of mind 
both parties would survive the contract period of five years. This finding Vf, 
summarized by the trial Court during Defendant's hearing for Motion to Am< 
the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, as follows: 
Court: "I think at the time he (Parks) entered into the contract, he L 
no idea that either one of them was going to die. They didn't think 
about that matter. I don't believe they considered it at all. It isn't 
like a marriage covenant where they say, until death do you part. B 
I don't think they considered it. Just entered into the contract and 11 
was a package deal and Mel Parks expected to pay the full amount 01 
-12-
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consideration. They expected to get the property described and 
they expected to pay the performance of Hyman Rudd not to com-
pete and the consideration was fully delivered so that he (Parks) 
owed the full amount of the money. 11 
Mr. Parks confirmed this basis of expectation of payment by specific testimony 
indicating that his statements regarding full payment were based on assumption 
that Rudd would survive the contract period (Tr. page 118, line 10-12). 
The fact that at the time of signing the agreements, Mel Parks expected to 
pay a total sum of $192, 000, does not imply the same conclusion with respect to 
payments pursuant to the event of premature death of Hyman Rudd. In the words 
of the Court, "they didn't think about that matter. " Therefore, it is not surprising 
that Mr. Parks had the expectation of paying the full amount under the terms of the 
agreements. Furthermore, such an expectation is not determinative as to the 
continuation of payments in the event of death. Since the parties did not contemplate 
the effect of death, the Court should not base its holding on party intent which 
relied on survival. 
It should be noted that we are dealing with a form of personal service 
contract, in which the death of the parties has profound legal effect. As was 
stated in Keller v. California Liquid Gas Corporation, 363 F. Supp 123 (1973), 
"Covenants Not to Compete have been held to be, by a majority of the courts, of 
a personal nature." Like any personal covenant, the parties typically expect the 
party to perform the services to survive the period of performance and therefore 
initially expect to pay the full amount of consideration bargained for undez: the 
personal covenant. Obviously, however, the court recognizes numerous situations 
in personal service contract law where the parties are not required to continue 
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payments under a change of circumstance such as death. 
The stated conclusion of the Trial Court, therefore, regarding the ex;· 
of Mel Parks to pay a total consideration of $192, 000 does not support the leg: 
conclusion that such payments must continue despite changes of circumstance 
This is true especially in view of the Court's specific holding that neither pa' 
thinking of death at the time the agreement was entered, and therefore could: 
have had specific intentions that the contract operate after the death of Hyma: 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO TREAT THE COVENANT NOT TOC. 
AS AN AGREEMENT SUPPORTED BY ITS OWN CONSIDERATION AND DID: 
THEREFORE APPLY THE LAW NORMALLY APPLIED TO SUCH RESTRICT 
COVENANTS. 
It is Defendant's position that the trial Court committed reversible er 
by dealing with the Covenant Not to Compete as a sales contract as opposed t: 
true character as a restrictive covenant. It is submitted that the previous IL 
clearly demonstrates that the intent of the parties was that the Covenant Not 
Compete was to be construed as a restrictive covenant and not as a sales agr 
The parties treated it as such, and the courts should do the same. Therefor· 
the primary issue of this case remains unresolved, to wit: 
UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF A COVENANT NOT TO COMPETE 
ANCILLARY TO THE SALE OF A BUSINESS, WHAT OBLIGATIONO 
PAYMENT REMAINS UPON THE DEATH OF THE NONCOMPETING 
PARTY, WHERE THERE WAS NO EXPECTATION BY EITHER 
PARTY THAT DEATH WOULD OCCUR. 
Defendant submits that there is a substantial body of law that has been devel 
on the subject of covenants not to compete, and that this law should have bee 
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applied to the present Covenant Not to Compete. The fact that the Trial Court 
viewed this law as "good authority" (Tr. page 120, line 12) for terminating the 
obligation of paynient upon the death of Rudd and that this was a "very close case", 
but held to the contrary in view of the "entire transaction" basis, is strong grounds 
for reversal in view of thehllacious assumption that Park's expectation to pay 
the full amount applied equally in the event of death of a party. 
POINT V 
THE LAW DEVELOPED UNDER THE SUBJECT OF "AGREEMENTS IN 
RESTRAINT OF TRADE" ESTABLISHES SPECIFIC LIMITATIONS WITH RESPECT 
TO THE DURATION OF COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE. 
Once it has been determined that this third agreement (Plaintiff's Exhibit 
P-1) should be treated as a Covenant Not to Compete, its construction should 
proceed under the law and public policy considerations which have been developed 
by the courts with respect thereto, Such considerations form a unique body of law 
denominated under the category of "Agreements in Restraint of Trade." This law 
is considered unique because it defines the conditions which permit the enforcement 
of an otherwise unenforceable agreement. It is well known, for example, that 
agreements in restraint of trade are unenforceable as being against public policy. 
When an entire business is being sold, however, the counter consideration of 
protecting the newly acquired goodwill of the business from wrongful misappropriatio:i: 
by the former owner justifies an exception to the general rule. As phrased by the 
Utah Supreme Court, 11 Restrictive covenants are generally upheld by the courts 
where they are necessary for the protection of the business for the benefit of which 
the covenant was made and no greater restraint is imposed than is reasonably 
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necessary to secure such protection. 11 Allen v. Rose Park Pharmacy, 237 P: 
823, 826 (1951). 
That the nature of this exception is based on the protection of 11 goodwi 
evidenced by the Court's statement in Rose Park as follows: 
" ... when the individual responsible for creating the goodwill and 
the business to which it attaches, become separa.ted, it is 
necessary to preserve that good will to the business by a covenant on 
the part of the individual that he will not compete in an area where 
his personal reputation will detach the old customers from the old 
business. 11 Id, p. 82 7. 
Construction and interpretation of the subject Covenant Not to Compete must 
therefore be based on the fundamental principles that (1) the Covenant exists: 
protect the goodwill and (2) the Covenant should not be given greater operatic: 
than is necessary to effect such protection. 
POINT VI 
UPON THE DEATH OF THE COVENANTOR, A COVENANT NOT TO 
COMPETE BECOMES UNENFORCEABLE SINCE THE RESTRAINT IS NOL( 
REASONABLY NECESSARY TO SECURE PROTECTION OF GOOD WILL. 
It is well established that Covenan1E Not to Compete must be reasonal 
geographical area and duration of time. With respect to this policy basis of 
protecting good will, it should be apparent that such restrictions in competit 
are unnecessary when the covenantor whose forbearance is the subject of th1 
restrictive covenant is no longer alive. Obviously, had the covenantor died 
selling the business, there would have been no need for a Covenant Not to Cc 
and therefore such a covenant would be invalid since it was not 11 re as on.ably 
necessary to secure such protection. 11 Rose Park, supra. Under such circ~ 
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the heirs would have to sell the business based on its real assets, without 
compensation for a noncompetition agreement. 
This same conclusion was reached in a comprehensive article entitled, 
"Enforceability of Covenant Against Competition Ancillary to Sale of Business, 
Practice, or Property, as Affected by Duration of Restriction" 45 ALR Zd 77. 
After stating the general rule that "a Covenant Not to Compete may extend over 
such period of time as is necessary to protect the interests of the purchaser or 
other Covenantee, but may not last longer," the annotation continues: 
"It is submitted that several important conclusions may be logically 
drawn from this principle, although there may be no express authority 
the ref ore in the reported decisions ... (2) The restraint cannot exceed 
the Covenantor' s own life. This time limit is obviously set by nature." 
(Emphasis added.) Id. page 153, 
Corbin phrases the sam·e conclusion with regard to time limitations in such 
restrictive covenants as follows: 
"One time limit is certainly set by nature and the law in all cases. 
The restraint cannot exceed the Promisor's (seller's) own life 
or the lives of those for whose forbearance he has contracted 
and who helped create the good will sold. " 
Corbin, Contracts, Section 1391, page 81. 
Applying these rules of law to the present case, therefore, it is clear that 
at the inception of the contract, the law proscribes intent for a Covenant Not to 
Compete to extend beyond the life of the covenantor (seller). Since, in the present 
case, it was determined that neither party had any expectation of death, then no 
intent with respect to continuation of the Covenant Not to Compete can be held to 
have existed. However, it can be said that the law implied a condition on the 
covenant to make it valid. That condition was that at the death of the seller (Rudd) 
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the covenant would no longer be enforceable. 
Since it has been shown that the Covenant Not to Compete was suppor: 
by its own consideration of forbearance from competition and that Mr. Park: 
would not have purchased the business except that a covenant not to compete 
added to the exchange of consideration, it must be assumed that the payment' 
made under the agreement were intended for purchasing the continued forbea 
of Rudd from competitive acts. This assumption is believed to be valid sine' 
contrary evidence was shown by Plaintiff that the parties had an intention to 
contrary or that the consideration exchanged under the first two agreements 
sale and purchase was insufficient. The parties labelled the payments as 
consideration for noncompetition and the monthly amounts were extended 011 
five year period of noncompetition. 
Therefore, when Hyman Rudd died, the terminating condition implie1 
every such covenant not to compete was fulfilled. The covenant was no loni 
enforceable and there was no longer a basis justifying continued payment by 
Rudd had been compensated for that period during which he complied with~ 
part of the agreement. Since Parks could not enforce the provisions of noni 
petition upon the heirs of Rudd, there was no obligation to make payments ti 
heirs under a terminated Covenant Not to Compete. 
POINT VII 
COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE TERMINATE AT THE DEATH CF 
COVENANTOR BECAUSE SUCH COVENANTS ARE PERSONAL TO THE 
COVENANTOR, AND UNENFORCEABLE AGAINST HIS HEIRS. 
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In addition to the aiore=entioned basis for terminating restrictive 
covenants under the protection theory of good will, the courts have also viewed 
these covenants as personal to the seller or covenantor and therefore terminable 
at his death. The U. S. District Court of Wyoming was confronted with a case 
similar to the case at hand in Keller v. California Liquid Gas Corp., 363 F Supp 
123, (1973), in which Judge Kerr specifically ruled that the payment obligation 
under a Covenant Not to Compete terminates at the death of the seller, 
Simply stated, the~ case arose based on the sale of a business by 
Plaintiff's decedent (Moncur) to Defendant (California Gas). As part of the sale, 
the parties executed an agreement in which Moncur promised not to compete for 
a period of ten years. In return, Defendant agreed to pay "the sum of One Hundred 
Thousand Dollars ... " to be paid in ten annual installments. After Moncur died, 
Defendant paid two more installments ($20, 000. 00) but discontinued payments 
thereafter. The heirs and executor of the Moncur estate sued in an effort to 
obtain the balance owing under the Covenant Not to Compete. The basis for 
terminating the Covenant Not to Compete at the Seller's death was summarized 
as follows: 
"A Covenant Not to Compete, it has often been stated, is to be strictly 
construed and not be given effect beyond what is necessary to give the 
Covenantee the protection needed. Such Covenants Not to Compete are 
not favored at law and thus are strictly limited. They are not assignable 
by the Covenantor, nor can the Covenantee enforce them against the 
heirs of a deceased Covenantor. It is for such reasons that Covenants 
Not to Compete have been held to be, by a majority of the courts, of a 
personal n:ature." Id. page 126. 
Continuing, the Court stated: 
"As a personal Covenant made by the Sellers, it is clear that one not 
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a party to it cannot be enjoined or held liable under it. Just as 
clearly, such personal Covenants have been held to terminate 
at death. 11 ld. page 128. 
With respect to continued payments after death, the Court therefore held: 
11 
••• that the Covenant Not to Compete ceased upon the deaths of 
the Covenantors; that the Covenantee is entitled to the $20, 000. 00 
paid after the deaths of the Covenantors ... " Keller, Id. page 129. 
The similarities between Keller and the present case are striking. 
words of Plaintiff's counsel, "it's almost four square ... directly on the issue 
before the Court. 11 (Tr. page 63, lines 1-2.) More significantly, the Court 
decided Keller on motions for summary judgment, stating, "The case at bar: 
present some slight issues of fact, but none of a material nature, and in any 
the ultimate legal result is clear. " (Emphasis added) Id., page 126. In othe: 
words such agreements are subject to the effects of the law such as is stated 
Corbin and the ALR citation previously quoted, to the effect that they do notl' 
effect after the life of the Covenanter. 
In Keller, it is interesting to note that the sales contract has the saroi 
appearance of entirety as that executed by Rudd and Parks. The Covenant Ni 
Compete was ancillary to other agreements effecting the sale of the business 
and totalled by itself "the s.:im of One Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100, 000.~ 
... paid by buyer to seller in ten yearly installments ... to be paid on Octobe: 
each succeeding year. " Id., page 12 5. It is submitted by Defendant that sue: 
appearance of "entirety" will arise with any valid covenant not to compete in' 
of the requirement that the sales agreement and restrictive covenant be anci 
to each other. 
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In both~ and the present case the deaths of the sellers occurred as 
a fortuitous event. In Keller, the seller was killed in an airplane crash only one 
year into the ten year period of performance. Similarly, Hyman Rudd died 
suddenly after only two years of performance under the Covenant Not to Compete, 
In both cases, death was not an expectation planned for in the transaction agreements. 
Also, both cases are brought by the heirs or estates of the deceased sellers, who 
were apparently the only parties contesting the effect of the agreement. 
At trial, Plaintiff pointed to a distinguishing fact in the Keller case, noting 
that the heirs in that case actually competed with the buyers, who were making 
payments to the estate under the covenant not to compete. Plaintiff noted that in 
the present case the heirs had not been involved in competitive activities. The 
fact that the plaintiffs had "unclean hands" in the Keller case, however, was not 
considered relevant by the Court in voiding the agreement upon the death of the 
seller. Quoting from Fleckenstein Bros. v. Fleckenstein, 57 A. 1025 (1904), the 
Court emphasized the absence of a cause of action against the competing heirs of 
the seller, saying: 
"The conduct of a wife or a son in destroying or appropriating a 
good will which a husband or father has sold may be morally 
reprehensible according to circumstances. A purchaser takes 
the risk ... , that, after all, the covenant may prove to have 
little or no protective value ... " Id., page 128. 
With repect to the heirs, the Court continued: 
"As a personal covenant made by the Sellers, it is clear that one 
not a party to it cannot be enjoined or be held liable under it. Just 
as clearly, such personal covenants have been held to terminate 
at death. In re International Match Corporation, 20 F. Supp 240 
(D. C. N. Y. 1937); Jones v. Servel, Inc., 135 Ind. App 171, 186 N. 
E. 2d 689 (1962), 6 Corbin, Contracts, Section 1335 (1961)." Id. 
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As to the effects of termination, the Court stated: 
"The covenant in issue is clear and unambiguous; it is of a personal 
nature; and it terminated upon the deaths of the covenantors. As 
stated by many, equity will not assist a party seeking to enforce a 
hard bargain. " Id. 
In concluding, Judge Kerr stated the practical reason why it is inappropriate 
permit the heirs of a seller to enforce payment provisions under a covenant: 
to compete. Responding to plaintiffs' request for specific performance, the. 
stated: 
"Plaintiffs would ask the court to allow them to compete against 
defendant while still requiring payments under a covenant, which 
as shown, supra, has ceased to exist. The court cannot be a party 
to such an unconscionable bargain." Id. 
!t should be noted that it was not the particular plaintiffs with unclean hands 
that were the "unconscionable bargain"; but rather, it was the occurrence oi 
situation that would "allow them (heirs} to compete against defendant while: 
requiring payments under a covenant, which as shown, supra, has ceased to 
Plaintiff is asking for the judicial approval of this same unconsciona: 
bargain. Rudd's estate asks the Court to affirm a decision which allows the 
to compete, while still requiring payments from defendant under a nonexiste 
covenant. That these heirs are or are not competing at the present is not tL 
The fact remains that at any point over the remainder of the contract period 
heirs could use the thousands of dollars paid by defendant under the noncom: 
agreement to establish a competing company. !n such circumstances, Mel: 
would be powerless to take any action against them. 
Plaintiff would argue that such competition ha.s not occurred and the' 
that this argument is inapplicable. Defendant asserts, however, that equit 
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look at what can happen, as well as what has happened. Mr. Parks entered into 
an agreement with Mr. Rudd which he has fully performed. With the death of Rudd, 
there was a termination of the agreement. This Court should not now impose a 
new agreement for the benefit of heirs who had no role in creating the good will 
subJect to the Covenant Not to Compete, nor any relation to the Covenant. In such 
circumstance, the heirs receive a benefit not bargained for and Parks assumes a 
liability which was not part of the agreement. 
POINT VIII 
THE COURT SHOULD RESOLVE THE INTERESTS OF THE RESPECTIVE 
PARTIES BY MAKING THE APPROPRIATE CONSTRUCTION OF THE FmAL 
AGREEMENTS OF THE PARTIES, WITHOUT REFERENCE TO EXTRANEOUS 
MATTERS. 
Defendant submits that the parties reached an arms -length agreement as 
experienced businessmen. It must be assumed that the bargain reached was 
based on the mutual assent process, and that for the Court to attempt to adjust 
interests at this point would certainly be unfair to Parks whose willingness to 
purchase Rudd's business was based upon the specified terms of the respective 
three agreements. 
It is acknowledged by all parties that the agreements for sale and purchase 
of the business assets have been fully performed and are not in issue. As to the 
Covenant Not to Compete, there has been shown no ambiguity which justifies going 
beyond the signed agreement. Since the only issue regarding this agreement is 
the effect of the death of Hyman Rudd on payments, and since the fact finding 
of the trial court showed no intent on the part of the parties which related to the 
occurrence of death, extraneous matters will not be useful to 
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In attempting to extend the Covenant Not to Compete beyond its natura. 
life based upon the life of the seller, Plaintiff would ask this Court to irnplYt 
by the parties in a conventional "heirs clause" contained in the covenant, t 
clause states, "It is expressly understood that the stipulations aforesaid are 
apply to and bind the heirs, executors, and administrato:::s of the respective 
parties," .Evidence with respect to the insertion of this clause is sumrnariz1 
as follows: 
1. The parties to the agreement did not request such a clause (Tr. y 
2. The attorney for Parks utilized a form book having the clause as 
part of a covenant not to compete, (Tr. 100). 
3. The secretary for the attorney preparing the agreement inserted: 
clause as part of the boilerplate of the form book, (Tr. 100-101). 
4. Neither party demonstrated any awareness of the clause, as was: 
clear by the trial court: "!think his answer is clear. Lawyersr 
these contracts and the clients sign them. They don't know whyt 
provisions are in there or what they mean in many cases." (Tr,i 
27, lines 24-27), 
This very fact pattern is what the Missouri Supreme Court was refer 
to in dealing with an "heirs clause" in a personal service contract. In cons1 
the ambiguity that arises by the presence of such a paragraph in the agreerr' 
the Court stated: 
"That paragraph is not ambiguous in the sense that its meaning 
is doubtful or uncertain or that it is equivocal.,." Jones v. Joy 
Manufacturing Co., 381 SW 2d 860, (1964), 
The Court went on to say that the application of such a paragraph to contrac: 
provisions not calling for personal services (i.e., survivable obligation oii 
Covenant Not to Compete) "would not be unusual and is clear enough." Con: 
"In a contract for personal services, l1owever, at least insofar as v 
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heirs are concerned, its inclusion is inappropriate." M·, page 863. 
The Court went on to hold that no ambiguity existed based on the law that: 
"The possibility of termination of a contract for distinctive 
personal services by the death of the party to render the services 
must be regarded as an inescapable concomitant of every such 
contract." (Emphasis added). Id., page 863. 
Although the heirs clause does not relate to the "personal" covenants of 
the seller, it is recognized that there are obligations which can survive the death 
of the buyer. Since the buyer's obligation is only to pay money, it is generally 
recognized that the payment obligations continue after the buyer's death or also 
upon sale of the business and good will to a new buyer. It may well be for this 
reason that the heirs clause was placed in the form book as boilerplate. Certainly, 
there are substantial contract interests aside from the personal service aspects, 
which should be properly preserved through the death of the parties. Therefore, 
Defend.ant submits that no ambiguity exists regarding the subject Covenant Not to 
Compete. 
Viewing the Covenant Not to Compete as a whole, it is apparent that the 
payment period of five years and the noncompetition period of five years were 
coordinated to provide the practical result of ensuring performance by Rudd in 
order to obtain the monthly payments due. This coordination of performance to 
payments further reinforces the independent meaning given to the Covenant by the 
parties. 
Plaintiff indicates contrary intent by referring to the totality of consideration 
expressed in the covenant, in terms of "the sum of $95, 000. 00." This, however, 
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be paid over the life of the contract, assuming no change of conditions. Such 
language is commonly used, such as was referenced in Keller. 
In Jones v. Servel, 186 NE 2d 689 (1962 Indiana)., the court dealt with 
effect of death in a covenant not to compete and was confronted with similar 
language. The forbearance from competition was "for a period of one year,' 
the consideration in return was to pay a salary "at the rate of $75, 000. 00 pe: 
annum, payable in equal monthly installments. The Covenanter died after ti 
months. Since no services were rendered except those in connection with thi 
Covenant Not to Compete, the estate sued for full payment contending comple: 
of performance of the Covenant Not to Compete by the death of the Covenanto: 
waiver of other services. The court stated: 
"If the personal service clause in the contract and the Covenant 
contained therein Not to Compete are personal service contracts 
in the sense that they terminate on death, the appellant would have 
no action regardless of the merits of his contention." Id. page 693. 
The court went on to hold that Covenants Not to Compete are personal and thi 
terminated at death. The so-called "entirety" language was without dfect, 
POINT IX 
THE "STRONG PROOF RULE" APPLIED BY FIRST, SECOND, FIF'. 
AND SIXTH U.S. CIRCUIT COURTS WITH RESPECT TO CHALLENGES OF 
ALLOCATIONS TO COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE SHOULD APPLY TO 
PLAINTIFF'S CHALLENGE REGARDING SEVERABILITY VS. ENTIRETYA 
OTHER ALLOCATION QUESTIONS. 
It appears to Defendant that the primary effect of the trial court's ho: 
is to impose a new allocation of consideration upon the parties - -different tb 
$95, 000 agreed upon. This is considered improper in view of the fact that! 
issue was not established by any evidence making a contrary showing. If ti 
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court had been willing to accept the allocation of the parties, then the Covenant Not 
to Compete, having terminated at death, would have been without effect thereafter. 
Numerous cases have arisen in the Federal Courts where parties have 
contracted to sell a business, making allocation of consideration to a Covenant 
Not to Compete. As stated in 13 Fed Tax Coordinator 2d 28, 326A: 
"The tax interests of buyer and seller of a business are conflicting, 
as far as consideration for the seller's agreement not to compete 
is concerned. The buyer wants deduction or rapid amortization 
of part of his purchase price. The seller prefers capital gain to 
ordinary income." 
The burden of proof required of Plaintiff's challenging this allocation has been 
summarized as follows: 
"In view of the conflicting tax interests of buyer and seller on this 
point, the courts will be inclined to accept a specific allocation set 
forth in a contract arrived at in an arm's length transaction. 264 
F 2d 305, 334 F 2d 58, 208 F Supp 306, 457 F 2d 1022, 450 F 2d 
959, 290 F 2d 501, 444 F 2d 557. The (challenging party) must carry 
a heavy burden of proof in upsetting such an allocation." (Emphasis 
Added.), Id., page 28328. 
Many courts, including the First, Second, Fifth and Sixth Circuits and the 
Tax Court require that the Plaintiff produce "strong proof" in order to set aside 
such allocations between seller and buyer. Defendant respectfully urges that 
where both Hyman Rudd and Mel Parks knowingly agreed to the subject allocation, 
the same "strong proof rule" should be required of Plaintiff herein. This is even 
more appropriate in this case, since it is admitted that both parties knew that, 
"these were the only terms on which Mel Parks would buy." 
In considering such reallocations of interests between buyer and seller, the 
U. S. Court of Claims, quoting an earlier case, stated: 
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"To permit a party to an agreement fixing an explicit amount for 
the covenant not to compete to attack that provision for tax pur-
poses, absent proof of the type which would negate it in an action 
between the parties, would be in effect to grant, at the instance 
of a party, a unilateral reformation of the contract with resulting 
unjust enrichment, Commissioner v. Danielson, supra, at 775 
of 378 F2d." Dakan v. U. S., 492 F2d 1192 (1974). 
In other words, it is highly doubtful that Hyman Rudd would have been, 
to bring a successful suit reallocating consideration from the Covenant Not to 
Compete to the purchase agreements of the transaction, The fact is that hev 
satisfied with the arrangement, despite its adverse tax consequences, becau: 
wanted to sell the business. Nevertheless, the estate now seeks such a reall 
in order to avoid the termination effects upon payments due after the death oi 
Defendant asserts that the heirs should not succeed where their intest 
would have failed. The parties struck their bargain and were satisfied. The1 
should expect nothing different. 
POINT X 
THE COURT SHOULD NOT UPHOLD THE SUBJECT TRIAL COURT 
HOLDING WITHOUT A REEVALUATION OF THE AMOUNT ASSIGNABLE TC 
COVENANT NOT TO COMPETE. 
Defendant asserts that the state of the law regarding obligations of pt 
under a covenant not to compete are clear. The death of the covenant or ter~ 
such payn1ents. Since the evidence clearly shows at least some independent' 
to the covenant, at least some allocation supported by the covenant consider< 
should be properly forfeited because of Rudd's death. Such a forfeiture can: 
be assessed upon evaluation of the actual value attributable to the Covenant: 
Compete, Defendant would suggest, therefore, that upholding the ruling oi 
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trial court requires remand for determination of a proper allocation of consideration 
to the subject covenant. 
As difficult as such a reassessment might be, the alternative of requiring 
full payment by Parks is contrary to the law and clearly inequitable. It would 
force Parks to make a purchase of a business under terms which the evidence 
shows that he was unwilling to make. 
CONCLUSION 
There is no question that the parties intended that a Covenant Not to 
Compete be part of the sales transaction between Hyman Rudd and Mel Parks. 
The substantial importance of the Covenant Not to Compete as a basis of the 
bargain between the parties is evident from the fact that there would have been 
no transaction without the Covenant Not to Compete. Both Mel Par.ks and Hyman 
Rudd accepted the provisions of the Agreements without contention and have 
fully performed their obligation. Plaintiff's evidence fails to meet the burden 
of proof to show contrary intent. The law is clear regarding termination of the 
Covenant Not to Compete with the death of the Covenantor--based both on per-
sonal service contract theory and restraint of trade considerations. These 
legal bases, along with the clear 11upport of case law, require a ruling consistent 
therewith. Defendant respectfully submits that such ruling can be effected with 
the appropriate dismissal of Plaintiff's Complaint and Cause of Action, with 
prejudice. 
DATED this ~day of April, 1978~J~T~ 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
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